ABSTRACT In recent years, privacy has received increasing attention to the development of the Internet. Yet, the problem still exists in the field of image processing that needs to be solved urgently. The cloud server has an abundant resource on computation for the specified computing tasks. With the rapid growth of personal and enterprise image data, more and more computing tasks are difficult to handle locally and are usually be outsourced to the cloud server for computing. Therefore, private image data protection while image processing has become our main concern. To solve this problem, we propose a scheme to extract secure Haar feature for privacy-preserving images, which can be applied to the face detection task. This paper solves the problem of extracting Haar feature from privacy-preserved images for the first time. Besides, we compare the numerical values in the ciphertext domain with double encryption protocols based on homomorphic encryption. In this scheme, we adopt Li et al.'s homomorphic encryption algorithm to protect image privacy. The security analysis of Li et al.'s encryption algorithm shows that the scheme we proposed is secure under the known plaintext attack and ciphertext attack. The experimental results show that the scheme can be implemented in polynomial time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, massive multimedia data (images, voice and video) are produced and disseminated in great quantities, which contain abundant information and boost the development of engineering applications. To deal with the multimedia data for research and application, feature extraction is a basic step. However, directly processing of the original multimedia data needs a lot of computation resources, especially for large datasets, which is often difficult to be satisfied for the collector of multimedia data. Cloud computing can provide more flexible services for tenants due to the rapid development of the Internet. Therefore, outsourcing largescale multimedia data processing to the cloud has become a popular option [1] , which provides a solution for individuals or groups with insufficient computing power.
More and more multimedia data are outsourced to the cloud for processing [2] , which leads to the problem of personal privacy. Since the cloud is not fully trusted, the direct exposure of multimedia data will lead to information leakage and cause great losses. So, it's urgent to perform feature extraction algorithm on the cloud without leaking multimedia data information. In this paper, the feature extraction of privacy preserved images is investigated.
Recently the problem of privacy preserved image processing has attracted a lot of research attention [4] , [5] , [18] , [19] in various fields, including face recognition system [3] - [5] , ECG signal [6] , fingerprint recognition system [7] , [27] , and feature extraction/detection. Take feature extraction for instance, LBP feature [26] , SIFT feature [8] , [25] , [28] , Hog feature [22] and shape-based image feature [9] are all investigated. Although a lot of efforts have been made regarding the query and processing of privacy-preserved multimedia data, the Haar feature extraction for privacy-preserved images still remains to be solved. In this paper, we investigate the scheme of extracting Secure Haar feature using security outsourcing model based on homomorphic encryption (HE), and apply the scheme to face detection in privacy protected image. Since this application requires numerical comparisons in ciphertext domain, we propose a double encryption scheme to achieve numerical comparisons in ciphertext domain.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: 1) For the sake of efficiency, the Haar feature is not calculated directly for each rectangle, but by an integral image. In this paper, the integral image and the square integral image are obtained under the encrypted image by the cryptosystem of Li et al. 2) Haar feature extraction must be executed in the encrypted domain. We investigate how the process can be performed within Li et al.'s cryptosystem [17] . 3) We propose the Secure Haar, which is extracted in an encrypted domain without multiple communication between the user and the cloud. Besides, there is only one round of communication is needed to transfer the encrypted image. 4) Compared with the original Haar feature, the Secure Haar can effectively protect the privacy of the original image while maintaining high efficiency. 5) We propose a double encryption scheme based on homomorphic encryption, and the double encryption scheme can realize the encrypted numerical comparison. The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the operations in the encryption domain and Haar feature, and gives a cryptosystem suitable for safely extracting the Haar feature. Section 3 gives the model used. Section 4 describes the proposed secure Haar and its application in face detection. Section 5 gives the experimental results. Section 6 summarizes this paper, and looks forward to the future research fields.
II. BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE A. HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
Homomorphic encryption is not only a kind of encryption system, but also one of the most popular technologies in the network age. Homomorphic encryption can effectively protect the privacy of user's data. We assume that: Encrypt is the encryption algorithm and the decryption algorithm is Decrypt, m is plaintext and f represents a quadratic function, ⊕ represents a certain operation. The traditional encryption algorithm cannot operate the data directly in the ciphertext domain, Decrypt(f (Encrypt(m 1 ), Encrypt(m 2 ))) = Decrypt(m 1 ⊕ m 2 ). However, it can be realized by the homomorphic encryption, Decrypt(f (Encrypt (m 1 ), Encrypt(m 2 ))) = Decrypt(m 1 ⊕ m 2 ), which provides the possibility for ciphertext to perform complex operations. Partial homomorphism encryption is divided into additive homomorphism and multiplicative homomorphism according to the homomorphic nature. For example, Paillier encryption is additive homomorphism [12] . RSA is multiplicative homomorphism [13] , [14] . When addition and multiplication are allowed to perform on the encrypted data, it is called fully homomorphic encryption algorithm [15] . The concept of fully homomorphism encryption has been put forward for a long time, but it was not until 2009 that Gentry constructed a fully homomorphic encryption algorithm based on ''lattice''. However, due to the low efficiency of calculation, fully homomorphism encryption cannot be applied on the large scale data yet.
In order to extract Secure Haar from encrypted images, we need an encryption system that can support the basic operations(addition and multiplication). So we choose Li et al.'s encryption algorithm. Moreover, Li et al.'s homomorphic encryption scheme jumps out of the public key encryption system, so it is much better than the traditional asymmetric homomorphic encryption scheme in time performance [17] .
The encryption algorithm designed in [17] is a symmetric encryption algorithm with additive homomorphism and finite multiplicative homomorphism. This encryption algorithm is a probabilistic encryption algorithm For the same plaintext, the result of encryption is different when apply multiple times, which ensures the semantic security of ciphertext. The encryption and decryption process of this encryption algorithm are illustrated as follows:
Key generation: we denote the key generation algorithm as KeyGen()
The key generation algorithm is a probabilistic encryption algorithm, which takes the security parameter λ as input and outputs the key SK = (s, q) and the common parameter p. p and q are large prime numbers, where p is far greater than q. The bit length of q depends on λ. s is a random number in Z * p . We record the encryption algorithm as E():
The encryption algorithm E() is a probabilistic algorithm, with the secret key SK , plaintext m ∈ Fq and parameter d as inputs, and the encryption algorithm will get a ciphertext c:
where d is an optional small integer, denotes the ciphertext level, and c is the ciphertext in d level. r is a positive random number. Note that |r| is the bit length of r, |q| is the bit length of q, |p| is the bit length of p. These three parameters satisfy the condition of |r| + |q| < |p| . Obviously, r is the random element of ciphertext c. 
Decryption algorithm D() is a deterministic algorithm, which takes the secret key SK , ciphertext c ∈ F q , and cipher- 
The calculation process is as follows:
Explanation of the homomorphism property of scalar multiplication: let c 1 be the ciphertext of plaintext m 1 , plaintext m 2 , in order to decrypt c 1 × m 2 correctly, (r 1 m 2 q + m 1 m 2 ) < p must be satisfied. The operation procedure is as follows:
Explanation of additive homomorphism: let c 1 , c 2 be ciphertext of plaintext m 1 , m 2 , because of the existence of mod p, the result of m 1 + m 2 is the result of group P. If d 1 = d 2 , the ciphertext can be obtained by modulo addition, and (r 1 + r 2 )q + m 1 + m 2 < p must be satisfied.
The operation procedure is as follows:
It is worth noting that besides the requirement of additive homomorphism, r1 > r2 also must be guaranteed in subtractive homomorphism. 
B. HAAR FEATURE
Haar feature is a frequently-used feature description operator in the field of computer vision, which can reflect the change of image grayscale. As shown in Figure 1 , Haar feature can be divided into four forms: edge feature, linear feature, central feature and diagonal feature. The feature template is composed of black and white rectangular. The sum of the black rectangular pixels minus the sum of the white rectangular pixels represents the eigenvalues of this template. During the feature extraction process, a detection window is selected, which traverses the current image and performs this work at multiple scales. The feature template will slide through the current detection window and will get all the Haar features of the current detection window. As shown in Figure 2 .
In order to reduce the time complexity, an integral map is used in extracting Haar features. The accumulated sum is calculated by taking all the pixels on the upper left side of the image, and each pixel in the image is replaced by this accumulated sum, and the image obtained in this way is called an integral image. Using the integral image allows the calculation of the Haar feature to be reduced to 2 additions and 1 subtraction, and section IV.A also explains the relevant content.
III. SCHEME DESCRIPTION
Hu et al. [25] propose SIFT features of privacy-protected images. Unlike our pixel-level encryption ideas, [25] uses the idea of oblivious transfer. The original image I and the same-size random matrix M are summed to obtain IM, and IM and M are respectively transmitted into cloud S1 and cloud S2 to obtain features v1 and v2, and finally returned to owner calculations v1 and v2 to obtain SIFT features. The batched secure multiplication protocol and the batched secure multiplication protocol proposed by Hu et al. can effectively reduce the communication and computational overhead. Differently, our outsourcing scheme for feature extraction in privacy preserved image generally contains two parts: image data holder and cloud. As shown in Figure 3 , the image data holder has the image to be processed. Because of the lack of computing resources, the image data holder needs to send the image data and feature extraction algorithm together to the cloud. Cloud has abundant computing resources and storage capacity, so it can complete the computing tasks and store a large amount of image data as required by the user. Considering the protection of privacy, the image data holder first encrypts images and send ciphertext to the cloud. Then, the cloud uses the accepted feature extraction algorithm to extract features from the encrypted image, and sends the encrypted features back to the image data holder. Finally, the image data holder decrypts the received encryption features into the characteristics of the plaintext. This model is so flexible that it can be extended to meet the requirements of different solutions. For example, the proposed scheme will use two not collusive cloud servers to perform an encrypted numerical comparison, which will be described in detail later. In existing schemes, cloud server is considered to be honest but curious, so let the cloud server do not know the clear text information that the user sends and cannot get the calculated plaintext result for privacy protection purposes. In other words, the server is powerful in completing the requested task, the result of encryption is obtained, but one cannot infer what he get from the information available.
We use the outsourcing model described above to implement a homomorphic encryption-based Haar feature extraction scheme for privacy-preserved images, which can be called Secure Haar. In this scheme, we adopt Li et al.'s homomorphic encryption scheme. Li et al.'s homomorphic encryption scheme can support additive homomorphism and finite multiplicative homomorphism. Because the whole process of extracting Secure Haar is completed in the encrypted image, and the procedure of the Haar feature extraction is efficient, Secure Haar preserves the characteristics of Haar feature and provides security at the same time, which provides the possibility for the application of Haar feature using Secure Haar. Unlike previous homomorphic encryption based image feature extraction solutions [10] - [12] , Haar feature is not exposed to cloud server and the cost of resource on computation is at a low level.
Haar feature is commonly used in target detection, such as face detection and pedestrian detection. We find that apart from the basic addition and multiplication operation in encrypted domain, the encrypted numerical comparison is still not well solved. The comparison scheme of Hsu requires high resource on computation and sacrifices the randomness of encrypted values [10] . In [17] , the comparison scheme also needs high resource on computation, while the scheme of Schneider [23] still has something worth discussing in terms of security. Therefore, we propose a double encryption scheme based on homomorphic encryption, which achieves encrypted numerical comparison, so that the Haar feature will not be exposed to any cloud server.
In the next section, we will describe the Secure Haar extraction in detail, and take face detection as an example for the application of Secure Haar, and describe our encrypted numerical comparison scheme.
IV. SECURE HAAR EXTRACTION AND APPLICATION

A. SECURE HAAR EXTRACTION
For the sake of time complexity, the first step to extract Haar feature is to compute integral image Ig. The size of known privacy protection image Img is w × h, the size of the integral image Ig is (w + 1) × (h + 1), where the first column and the first row is 0, and the remaining position values are:
Use the above mentioned homomorphic encryption algorithm to encrypt Img by pixel, we define encrypted pixel value as Imge(x, y):
Then the value of each point Ig e (x, y) except the first column and the first row of the encrypted integral image is:
The Haar feature is obtained from the feature template. There are black and white rectangles in the feature template. Haar feature is defined as the sum of the pixels of the white rectangular subtract the sum of the pixels of the black region. As shown in Figure 4 , the sum of pixel values v1 of the left black rectangle is:
When the integral image is obtained in the field of image ciphertext, we can know from the addition homomorphism VOLUME 7, 2019 operation rule mentioned earlier, and we define the r(x',y') as the random element of Img e (x , y ): Img(x , y )) mod p
Take Figure 4 as an example, the sum of encrypted pixel values v1 e of the black region is calculated as:
We first change the order of the terms in the formula:
And then we expand the terms:
Img e (x , y ) +
Img e (x , y )
Img e (x , y ))
Img(x , y ) + x ≤x1,y ≤y1
Img(x , y )
Img(x , y )+ x ≤x1,y ≤y2
Img(x , y ))) mod p
We can see that the random element of (18) is the sum of the encrypted pixel value in the black rectangle, and greater than 0. Therefore, it is feasible to get the value of the sum of pixels in the black rectangle by decrypting v1 e.
Similarly, we can get the sum of pixel values of white region v2by decrypting v2 e .
In the ciphertext domain, according to the definition, the Secure Haar F is defined as:
In the encryption system of Li et al, the subtraction operation must satisfy that r in the subtrahend is less than r in the minuend, in this case r in v2 e is less than r in v1 e . Because r is a random element in homomorphic encryption scheme, it cannot be guaranteed the requirement that the reduced random element is greater than the subtracted random element. So, when encrypt, the first eight bits of the random element r are the flag bits, consist of the coordinates of the current pixel, and the rest of the bits are random elements. As mentioned earlier in this article, r(x,y) is the random element of Img e (x,y) . If the length of r is different, it is meaningless to compare the size through the high position. In order to ensure the different r(x,y)is of the same length, we fill zeros in low positions to ensure the length is |p| − |q| − 1, as shown in Figure 5 .
Because the high 8 bits of r(x, y) is the coordinate of pixel, the other bits can be ignored when comparing the size of r(x, y). Actually, ''bit'' refers to the decimal digit, and the ''high 8 bits'' we mean that the first placeholder 1 is ignored. So in encrypted image, the size relationship between the random number R of the sum of encrypted pixels of different rectangular in the feature template, map to the size relationship of the pixel coordinates in the corresponding rectangle. In calculating the Secure Haar F, the random element R1 in v1 is the sum of the random numbers of the encrypted pixel value in the black rectangle, and the random element R2 in v2 is the sum of the random numbers of the encrypted pixel value ciphertext in the white rectangle. Determined by the coordinate points, obviously R2 > R1. Considering the diversity of Haar feature templates, in other words, the size relationship between R2 and R1 cannot be directly judged in other feature templates, so we do the following for v1e.
By analyzing different Haar feature templates, we further process the high 8 bits of r(x, y), 1, 000 add to x, and 1, 000 add to y, as shown in Figure 6 . And then subtract the subtraction V 1 by 32 × E (SK , 0, d 1 ) , where the high 8 bits of the random number use the 'smallest' point coordinates of the corresponding rectangle of feature template. In fact, the high 8 bits of r can choose any coordinates in the corresponding rectangle, and the number of 32 just for easy to use shift operation. Take figure 4 as an example:
x =x2,y =y1
r(x , y )) − 32 × r(x1, y1))q
Img e (x , y ) − 32 × 0) mod p (20) From the above formula, we can find that v1e minus 32 × E(SK , 0, d 1 ) can guarantee that R1 is reduced to ensure less than R2 while the value of plaintext v1 is unchanged. It is noteworthy that the cloud server, that performs the calculation, does not hold the key SK to encrypt 0, while the user uses different r with correspond coordinates to encrypt the image separately. The processing of r and the correctness of the (19) will be demonstrated in the section V with experimental data.
B. FACE DETECTION USING SECURE HAAR
Face detection is the basis of all face image analysis applications, such as face recognition, face validation, face tracking, etc. People often use Haar feature for face detection [11] . We will use the Adaboost cascade classifier and the pretrained face detector to carry on face detection for secure Haar feature. The process of face detection is described later, as shown in Figure 7 .
Adaboost cascade classifier contains multiple strong classifiers, where each strong classifier contains several weak classifiers. Each weak classifier values a Haar feature according to its own threshold. Add the sum of all weak classifiers under a strong classifier, if the threshold of the strong classifier is exceeded, the next strong classification will be carried out. If the result is less than the threshold of the current strong classifier, then exits the judgment of the window. Judging the face by cascading greatly reduces the computational cost. The face detector will set up a detection window with a size of w × w. This window will slide on the current image until all the images are traversed. In each window, Adaboost cascade classifier is used to detection. When the current size image traversal is over, the current image will be reduced, equivalent to enlarging the detection window. Do not end the detection until the image is smaller than the detection window. Because of the limitation of homomorphic operation, the reduction of dense images cannot use bilinear interpolation, cubic interpolation and other methods which need to change the pixel value. We can only use the nearest neighbor interpolation method. Our experiments show that the nearest neighbor interpolation method has little effect on the detection results compared with other methods in Haar feature face detection.
First, the user encrypts the image locally using Key1, sends it to cloud server A, and calculates the encrypted integral image and square integral image on cloud server A.
The threshold in the face detector is encrypted using Key2 and sent to the cloud server B.
In each test window, the value is calculated and the positive and negative of this parameter is judged. This value is obtained from the following formula:
Sqpisum is the sum of squares of encrypted pixels value of the detection window, and pisum is the sum of encrypted pixel value of the detection window. Similar to the idea of calculating the sum of pixels, the sum of squares of pixels is obtained from the square integral image SqIg for the sake of time. Similar to the definition of encrypted integral graph, the encrypted square integral graph SqIg e is as follows:
Img e (x , y ) 2 (22) Send the value to the secondary cloud server B to decrypt it, and judge whether the value is a positive or a negative one, and calculate the corresponding parameter fr:
The resulting parameter fr would be a decimal number. After testing, we decided to reserve 6 decimal places and magnify fr 1000000 times, and send it back to computational cloud Server A. Unfortunately, it needs to be judged on secondary cloud server B. Cloud server B will get the key Key1, but it can be found later that the Secure Haar will not be exposed to cloud server B after decrypt by Key2. In the current detection window, after cloud server A obtains the parameter fr returned by secondary cloud server B, the Secure Haar is computed using the scheme proposed above according to the feature templates of all weak classifiers contained in the strong classifier.
Haar is sent to the secondary cloud server B to decrypt by Key1 and compared with the threshold encrypt by Key2 of the corresponding weak classifier in the face detector. The specific comparison agreement will be introduced later.
C. ENCRYPTED NUMERICAL VALUE COMPARISON SCHEME
If Secure Haar is sent directly to cloud server B and cloud server B holds the Key1, the image information will be exposed to cloud server B. So we use the double encryption scheme to protect information. Key2 is used to encrypt Secure Haar F secondly using homomorphism. Because the ciphertext and detector thresholds were encrypted by Key2, it will not affect the relationship of size and will not expose Haar feature to cloud server B.
Cloud Server A uses the Key2 encryption Secure Haar, and the design of Key2 encryption scheme considers three premises:1). Because it is operated in the ciphertext domain of homomorphic encryption, it can only perform linear transformation of addition and multiplication.2). The value encrypted by the two encryption only needs to meet the demand of comparative size without accurate calculation. 3). Linear transformation cannot provide security enough, we need to use random element r c .
We set key Key2as:
Among them, k and r c are integers. Set the encryption algorithm as E(m,Key2):
As shown in Figure 8 , this is a two-party protocol . For this article, the two sides are compute server and compare server. The compute server holds the secure Haar F,corresponding parameter fr, the secret parameter k and the random number r, the compare server holds E(Key2,td) (compare server only holds E(Key2,td) where r = 0, and does not know the value of td, td is the threshold of the classifier) and homomorphic encryption key Key1. The compute server sends (26) to the compare server:
F has homomorphism, it supports pure scalar multiplication and additive homomorphism. Because the compute server does not hold Key1, it will generate r c using r × E (Key1, 1) .The E (Key1,1) is provided to the compute server in advance by the user.
We set up Secure Haar F corresponding Haar feature is f , and the threshold of classifier is td.The compare server first uses Key1 to decrypt E(Key2, F × fr) to get: (27) Then compare k × (f × fr + r) with k × td, if k × (f × fr + r) <= k × td, we will get f × fr < td and take the value of the left leaf node of the current classifier, if k × (f × fr + r) > k × td, s end back to the left and right leaf nodes and (k × (f × fr + r) − k × td), and the compute server node compares r with ( the value of the left leaf node; if r < (k × (f × fr + r)− k × td), then f × fr > td, take the value of the right leaf node.
It can be found that the magnitude of r is positively related to the protection effect of f , the range of values of r is discussed below.
We randomly selected 150 images in the FDDB data set, and randomly selected 500,000 feature value distributions as shown in Figure 9 . The difference between the feature value and the corresponding classifier threshold is shown in Figure 9 .
It can be seen that the difference is mainly concentrated in the range of (−500000, 500000). If the value of r is greater than 500000, the two likelihoods obtained by the compare server through the judgment result are almost equal probability, and the feature value in the range. It is indistinguishable from other values. Therefore, when the range of r is greater than 500000, our scheme can protect the security of the feature values. We set the range of r to [500000, 1500000] .
Compare server sends strong classifier threshold to compute server. The score of weak classifier after summing on compute server is compared with the threshold of strong classifier . If the score is higher than the threshold, then goes to the next strong classifier; otherwise exits the current detection window. If the current detection window passes all the strong classifiers, the current window is the window containing the face. After completing all detection, the matrix list of face regions is generated, and the similarity matrix is merged to get the face detection window, as shown in Figure 11 .
In fact, in this section we use the basic Haar feature. Some rotating Haar features can reduce some false alarm rate [20] . However, compared with the lifting time, we think that the basic Haar feature is more suitable for the proposed scheme.
D. SECURITY ANALYSIS
According to the description in section 3, cloud servers are honest but curious. Cloud server performs the Haar feature extraction algorithm in ciphertext domain strictly according to the process described above, and infer the user's image data according to the values obtained during the execution of the algorithm. Based on this assumption, in our scheme, all the image data is encrypted and sent to the cloud server, so the security of the model is determined by the security of the encryption algorithm. Literature [17] shows that Li et al.'s homomorphic encryption scheme is secure. In this paper, we propose a quadratic encryption algorithm based on homomorphic encryption, which is find to be a set of equations with n values but 2n + 1 parameters to be solved, and if the value of r is greater than 500000, the two likelihoods obtained by the compare server through the judgment result are almost equal probability, and the feature value in the range, it is indistinguishable from other values. Therefore, when the range of r is greater than 500000, our scheme can effectively protect the security of the feature values. We use the ''opencv_traincascade'' training classifier provided by opencv. The parameter settings are shown in Table 3 .
First, combined with experimental data, we prove that the process of r and v1 e mentioned in section 4 can ensure the correct results of v2-v1. In the experiment, the size of the face detection window is 24 × 24. The Haar feature defines that the numbers of pixels of the white rectangle and the black rectangle are equal. If they are not equal, they are multiplied by the corresponding coefficient and then calculated. Because the size of the face detection window is 24 × 24, so the high 4 bits of r1(v1 e random element) and r2(v2 e random element) can satisfy: And :
Also∵ the highest bit is 1 ∵ r1 high4bits < r1 high4bits − 32 * 10000 ∴ r1 highest 1&high 4bits − r2 highest high 4bits < /r1 highest high 4bits − r2 highest high 4bits − 32 * 10000 < 0
So v2 -v1 is suitable for homomorphic subtraction. In order to make a proper evaluation of our scheme, the selection of experimental data should be representative and can fully display the advantages and disadvantages of the scheme. The goal of our scheme is face detection, so we adopt the classic FDDB dataset [24] to test our scheme. This dataset contains the annotations for 5171 faces in a set of 2845 images taken from the Faces in the Wild dataset. In the face detection experiment of privacy-preserving image, the Adaboost cascade classifier is trained by 2400 images in the FDDB dataset to obtain the face detector. Then the face detector is processed according to the scheme. We take the remaining 150 images as test set, and use the original face detection scheme and our privacy preserved image face detection scheme to process the test set, and record the experimental results, including 87 simple images of a single face, 63 complex scenes and multiple faces. In order to evaluate the performance of our scheme correctly, this paper uses the concept of confusion matrix and gives TP (True Positive, that is, face is detected as face.), FP (False Positive,namely, nonface detection for face.) and FN (False Negative, that is, face is detected as nonface.) respectively in the case of single face and multiple faces. From Figure 11 , we observe that our scheme and the original Haar feature face detection scheme are basically the same. We face the same problems: 1. The number of missing faces in complex scenes does not meet the expectations; 2. There is still room to improve the effect of occluded face detection.
Let the trained classifier have m strong classifiers (we got 25) and the image size is [w, h].A round of communication is required between user and cloud compute. In the worst case scenario between compute server and compare server (w×h)+(m×w×h) communication, but the structure of the cascade classifier will let the number of communications greatly reduce.
We test 150 images from the FDDB dataset on one computer. The size of the images is about 400 × 300, and the average running time and image encryption consumption are shown in Figure 13 . The orange and blue represent the time overhead of the user and the time overhead of the server, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserved face detection method, which paves the way for the follow-up face recognition and face tracking. This is a meaningful work for privacy protection in the various scenes of the Internet. However, homomorphic comparison has not been achieved without losing the randomness of ciphertext, which leads to a higher number of rounds between cloud server A and cloud server B, and is still one of the bottlenecks of speed. In complex scenes and detection of occlusion faces, our scheme still has great room for improvement. In the future work, we will focus on homomorphic comparison scheme to improve the effect of face detection in complex scenes, and carry out these works based on the privacy preserved images.
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